This was the result of confusion between signalmen at each end of the tunnel, although other factors also contributed. This part of the line was still being worked by the time interval system and there were three trains booked to leave Brighton at 10 minute intervals. However, due to the late running of the first train, they actually left at 8:28, 8:31 and 8:35.
The procedure for signalling a northbound train train through the tunnel was for the man at the south end to send a `train in' signal via telegraph to the man at the north end. When the train emerged at the north end, the man there sent a `train out' signal to the south end which rang a bell which would then be acknowledged by the south end. The southern end signal man could also operate a distant signal to give advance warning to approaching trains, this would be automatically reset to danger by passing trains. The same telegraph instruments were used in both directions and were not of the pegging type so there was no reminder to either signalman of which signals had been sent, nor were they required to keep record books of signals and times sent.
The first train entered the tunnel after passing the distant signal at CLEAR and was telegraphed to the north end as `train in'. Unfortunately the distant failed to reset to DANGER and the second train approached closely behind the first at full speed. Having received no indication from the north end that the first train was out of the tunnel, the signalman waved a red flag to the driver as he passed by. At that moment he received the `train out' signal and so immediately showed a white flag to the guard as the rear of the train passed him into the darkness of the tunnel and then sent `train in' to the north end. He then managed to restore his distant signal to DANGER.
The two signal men disagree on what then followed. The south signalman maintained that he asked the north end on the telegraph whether the second train had left the tunnel. The north end thought he was referring to the first train and replied yes. The northern signal man claimed that he received a message from the south end saying the train was not out, to which he replied yes, followed by a signal from the south end saying `they are running into each other'.
Whatever the signals sent, as the third train approached the tunnel the southern end signalman thought the second train was out of the tunnel and accordingly showed the driver CLEAR signals. However, the driver of the second train had in fact seen his red flag and managed to stop with the back end of the train about 200 yards inside the tunnel. He then started to reverse slowly back out of the tunnel just as the third train entered at about 25 mph. The resulting accident killed 23 and injured a further 176.
Capt H.W.Tyler who inquired into the accident was scathing in his findings, not so much of the signalmen's misunderstanding, but of the Brighton stationmaster who had not observed the 5 minute minimum interval between departures, the lack of block telegraph on the line, the inadequate telegraph equipment between north and south ends of the tunnel, and the lack of registers for recording times of telegraph signals and passing trains.
He recomended the adoption of the block telegraph system which would provide a means of operating a space interval system between trains and a minimum of three telegraph instruments to be provided for the signalmen at each end of a telegraph section, one for each track to act as a signal which could be pegged at line clear or line blocked and one for more general communications.
The reply from the LBSCR company shows the thinking prevelant to many railway boardrooms at that time: `The Board feel bound to state frankly that they have not seen reason to alter the views which they have so long entertained on this subject, and they still fear that the telegraphic system of working recommended by the Board of Trade will, by transferring much responsibility from the engine drivers augment rather than diminish the risk of accident'.
At this time the railway inspectorate could only recommend, not insist. New signalling and safety developments were only adopted reluctantly by cost conscious railway boards.
Last updated 12 May 1999 by Mark Dewell.